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1. Introduction
The discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic discount function {1,βδ,βδ
2,βδ
3,...} is used to model
high rates of short-run discounting.1 With β<1, this present-biased discount function
generates a gap between a high short-run discount rate (−lnβδ) and a low long-run
rate (−lnδ). The quasi-hyperbolic discount function has been used to study a range of
behaviors, including consumption, procrastination, addiction and search.2
Extending the work of Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) on continuous-
time models of non-exponential discounting, the current paper shows how to operationalize
quasi-hyperbolic time preferences in continuous time. Our model — which we call the
instantaneous-gratiﬁcation model or IG model — applies tractably to a much wider range of
settings than existing models. It applies to incomplete-market settings in which liquidity
constraints arise because future labor income can’t be used as collateral; and it works
with an economically rich class of utility functions which is much larger than the class
with constant relative risk aversion. Consequently, we do not need to restrict analysis to
linear policy rules or to settings in which such rules support an equilibrium.
We develop the IG model in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, following Barro and Luttmer-
M a r i o t t i ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h ep r e s e n ti sv a l u e dd i s c r e t e l ym o r et h a nt h ef u t u r e ,m i r r o r i n g
the one-time drop in valuation implied by the discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic discount
function. However, we assume that the transition from the present to the future occurs
with a constant hazard rate λ. This assumption reduces the Bellman equation to a pair
of stationary diﬀerential equations that characterize the current- and continuation-value
functions. We call the resulting model the present-future model or PF model.
In the second step, we let the hazard rate λ of transitions from present to future go
to ∞. This brings us to the IG model. The Bellman equation for the IG model is even
simpler than that of the PF model: it is a single ordinary diﬀerential equation.
Using convex duality we characterize the solution of the IG model. We prove and then
exploit the fact that the value function of the IG model is identical to the value function
of an optimization problem with (i) the same long-run discount rate as the IG model, and
(ii) a diﬀerent ﬂow utility function that depends on both the level of consumption and
the level of ﬁnancial assets.
1See Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997). Strotz (1956) ﬁrst formalized the idea that the
short-run discount rate is greater than the long-run discount rate.
2For example, see Akerlof (1991), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobac-
man and Weinberg (2001), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), and Della Vigna and Paserman (2005).Instantaneous Gratification 2
Hence the IG model, which is dynamically inconsistent, has the same value function as
a non-standard but dynamically consistent optimization problem. The IG model is not,
however, observationally equivalent to this optimization problem: the IG model and the
optimization problem share the same long-run discount rate and value function, but they
have diﬀerent instantaneous utility functions and equilibrium policies.3 The non-standard
optimization problem is interesting, not because we think it is psychologically relevant,
but rather because its partial equivalence enables us to use the machinery of optimization
to study the value function of a dynamically inconsistent problem.
The IG model therefore carves out a tractable niche between dynamically inconsistent
models and dynamically consistent models. On the one hand, it features dynamically
inconsistent behavior and rational expectations. So, at each moment, the individual acts
strategically with regard to her future preferences. On the other hand, the fact that the
IG value function coincides with the value function of a related optimization problem
implies that the IG model inherits many standard regularity properties.
For example, the value-function-equivalence result implies that the IG model has a
unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result is surprising, since the quasi-hyperbolic model
is a dynamic game. Indeed, Krusell and Smith (2000) have shown that Markov-perfect
equilibria are not unique in a deterministic discrete-time setting. In contrast, we provide
two uniqueness results. First, we prove uniqueness in the case in which asset returns
are stochastic. Second, we show that the unique equilibrium of the stochastic IG model
converges to an equilibrium of the corresponding deterministic model as the noise in the
asset returns goes to zero. In other words, we are able to select a unique equilibrium of
the deterministic IG model by using a standard equilibrium-reﬁnement procedure.4
Similarly, we can give a detailed characterization of the consumption function in the
IG model. When the expected rate of return is below a key threshold, the equilibrium
consumption function displays a discontinuity at the liquidity constraint. Consequently,
consumption falls discontinuously when a consumer spends down her assets and hits the
liquidity constraint. This intuitive prediction is not possible in dynamically-consistent
consumption models, which imply that the timepath of consumption is continuous, even
at the point at which the consumer hits a liquidity constraint.
3See Laibson (1997) and Barro (1999) for cases with observational equivalence of policy functions.
4Our uniqueness result even oﬀers something new in settings in which linear policy rules support an
equilibrium: it tells us that if one can ﬁnd an equilibrium in linear policy rules then that equilibrium is
unique in the set of all policy rules, linear or non-linear.Instantaneous Gratification 3
Finally, the IG model features a single welfare criterion, even though the model involves
dynamically inconsistent behavioral choices. Because the present is valued discretely more
than the future, the current self has an incentive to overconsume; but the discretely higher
value of the present only lasts for an instant, so this overvaluation does not aﬀect the
welfare criterion. Hence, the model simultaneously features a single welfare function and
a behavioral tendency toward overconsumption.
In summary, the IG model is generalizable with regard to both market completeness
and consumption preferences, supports a unique equilibrium, makes new predictions about
the consumption function, and identiﬁes a single sensible welfare criterion.
In Section 2 we present the PF model of time preferences. In Section 3 we present
the consumption problem that we use as our application. In Section 4 we describe the
IG model, which arises when we start with the PF model and let the hazard rate of
transition from present to future go to inﬁnity. In Section 5 we show that the IG model
has the same value function as a related, but non-standard, dynamically-consistent opti-
mization problem. We use this partial equivalence result to prove equilibrium existence
and uniqueness. We also use it to derive a unique equilibrium of the limiting version of
our model in which the noise in the economy goes to zero. In Section 6, we characterize
the equilibrium consumption function for the limiting case of no labor income. In Section
7, we characterize the equilibrium consumption function for the general case with labor
income. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Present-Future Model of Time Preferences
We now describe a class of discount functions that model present-biased preferences in
continuous time. There are two alternative representations: a stochastic discount function,
which we present ﬁrst, and a deterministic discount function.
2.1. A Stochastic Discount Function. In the discrete-time formulation of quasi-
hyperbolic time preferences, it is natural to divide time into two intervals: the present —
consisting of only the current period — and the future. All periods, present and future, are
discounted exponentially with the discount factor 0 <δ<1. Future periods are further
discounted with uniform weight 0 <β≤ 1. Combining these pieces, the present period
(i.e. t =0 ) receives full weight, and future periods (i.e. t ≥ 1)a r eg i v e nw e i g h tβδ
t.
This model can be generalized in two ways. First, the present could last for an arbitrary
length of time, instead of ending after the current period. Second, the duration of theInstantaneous Gratification 4
present could be stochastic, instead of being deterministic. Both of these generalizations
have natural continuous-time analogues.
Consider an economic self born at time s0 =0 . Call this self ‘self 0’. The lifetime
of self 0 is divided into two intervals: a ‘present’, which lasts from s0 to s0 + τ0;a n d
a ‘future’, which lasts from s0 + τ0 to ∞. Think of the present as the interval during
which control is exercised by self 0, and of the future as the interval during which control
is exercised by subsequent selves. The length τ0 of the present is stochastic, and is
distributed exponentially with hazard rate λ ∈ [0,∞).
When the present of self 0 ends at s0 + τ0, a new self is born and takes control of
decision-making. Call this new arrival ‘self 1’. The preferences of self 1, like those of
self 0, can be divided into two intervals. Self 1 has a present that lasts from s1 = s0 +τ0
to s1 + τ1, and a future that lasts from s1 + τ1 to ∞. Continuing in this way, we obtain
a sequence of selves {0,1,2,...} born at dates {s0,s 1,s 2,...}.F o ra l ln ≥ 1,s e l fn has a
present that lasts from sn = sn−1 + τn−1 to sn + τn, and a future that lasts from sn + τn
to ∞. Figure 1 provides a visual representation.
We assume that all selves discount exponentially with discount factor 0 <δ<1.
Furthermore, each self values her future discretely less than her present, discounting it
by the additional factor 0 <β ≤ 1. More explicitly, we assume that self n applies the
discount factor Dn(t) to the utility ﬂow at time sn + t,w h e r e
Dn(t)=
(
δ
t if t ∈ [0,τn)
βδ
t if t ∈ [τn,∞)
)
. (1)
In other words, her discount function Dn decays exponentially at rate γ = −lnδ up to
time τn, drops discontinuously at τn t oaf r a c t i o nβ of its level just prior to τn,a n d
decays exponentially at rate γ thereafter.5 Figure 2 plots a single realization of this
discount function, with τn =3 .4.
This continuous-time discount function nests exponential discounting: either set λ =0 ,
so that the future never arrives; or set β =1 , so that there is no distinction between
present and future. It is similar to some of the deterministic discount functions used in
Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003). However, we assume that τn is stochastic.
Among other things, this ensures that the expectation of the discount function is smooth.
5The lengths {τ0,τ1,τ2,...} of the present intervals are i.i.d.Instantaneous Gratification 5
When λ →∞ , the discount function Dn converges to the limiting function:
D∞(t)=
(
1 if t =0
βδ
t if t ∈ (0,∞)
)
.
Characterizing this limiting case is the main focus of the current paper.6
2.2. A Reinterpretation Using a Deterministic Discount Function. The ar-
guments in this paper are consistent with a second interpretation of the time preferences
described above: one can assume that a new self is born every instant; that the present
of each self lasts only an instant; and that each self has a deterministic discount function
¯ D equal to the expected value of the stochastic discount function Dn described above
(Harris and Laibson 2001).7 We describe this alternative deterministic interpretation in
the current subsection and compare it with the stochastic approach in Subsection 2.3.
Readers who wish to skip this material, can jump immediately to Section 3 without loss
of continuity.
In the deterministic interpretation, each self uses the discount function ¯ D given by
¯ D(t)=E
£
Dn(t)
¤
= e
−λtδ
t +( 1− e
−λt)βδ
t.
¯ D(t) is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term is the probability e−λt that the drop in Dn
does not occur before time t, times the discount factor δ
t that applies before the drop.
The second term is the probability 1 − e−λt with which the drop in Dn occurs after time
t, times the discount factor βδ
t that applies after the drop. ¯ D(t) can also be written
¯ D(t)=( 1− β)e
−(γ+λ)t + βe
−γt,
where γ = −ln(δ) > 0 is the long-run discount rate. Written this way, ¯ D(t) is seen to be
a convex combination of the short-run exponential discount factor e−(γ+λ)t,w i t hw e i g h t
1 − β, and the long-run exponential discount factor e−γt,w i t hw e i g h tβ.
The instantaneous discount rate of the deterministic discount function ¯ D is
−
¯ D0(t)
¯ D(t)
= γ +
λe −λt(1 − β)δ
t
¯ D(t)
.
6Notice that, because τn → 0 as λ →∞ , the expectation of the discount function – which is smooth
when λ is ﬁnite – has a discontinuity when λ = ∞. This does not cause any problems.
7See footnote 15 for a development of this line of argument.Instantaneous Gratification 6
It too is a sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term is the long-run (exponential) discount rate
γ. The second term is the expected drop in D at time t,n a m e l yλe −λt(1−β)δ
t,d i v i d e d
by expected value of D at time t,n a m e l y ¯ D(t).( T h eﬂow probability of a drop at time t
is λe −λt and the size of the drop is (1−β)δ
t.) Note that the instantaneous discount rate
falls from γ + λ(1 − β) at t =0to γ at t = ∞. Figure 3 plots ¯ D for λ ∈ {0, 0.1,1,∞}.
2.3. Comparison of the Stochastic and Deterministic Discount Functions.
The stochastic and deterministic discount functions diﬀer in one key way: the stochastic
discount function assumes a present of non-inﬁnitesimal duration τn > 0,w h e r e a st h e
deterministic discount function assumes a present of inﬁnitesimal duration dt. Hence the
stochastic discount function assumes a countable number of non-inﬁnitesimal selves, while
the deterministic discount function assumes a continuum of inﬁnitesimal selves.
The two formulations generate the same equilibrium behavior. To see why, note that
the current self in the stochastic formulation is dynamically consistent during her period
of control between time sn and time sn+1 = sn + τn. It therefore makes no diﬀerence
whether we regard her as a non-inﬁnitesimal agent, who decides how to behave at the
outset of her control interval, or as a continuum of inﬁnitesimal agents, each of which
makes a decision during its instant of control.
The stochastic formulation has two advantages over the deterministic one. First, it
can be set up using only standard mathematical tools. Second, when the stochastic
formulation is used, we can derive the IG model in a single step.8 We therefore focus on
the stochastic formulation.
3. Application to a Consumption Problem
We now describe an important economic environment that we use to illustrate the im-
plications of the discounting model. We study an inﬁnite-horizon consumption-savings
problem with liquidity constraints (cf. Deaton 1991, Carroll 1992). We include liquidity
constraints, since they make a fundamental diﬀerence to the analysis by necessitating
non-linear policy rules. On the other hand, we exclude labor-income uncertainty, since
that would complicate the notation and does not aﬀect our conclusions. This section also
deﬁnes equilibrium and introduces the Bellman-system representation.
8In the analysis using the stochastic discount function, we let λ →∞ . In doing so, we simultaneously
pass from non-inﬁnitesimal to inﬁnitesimal selves and from the ﬁnite-λ discount function to the inﬁnite-λ
discount function. By contrast, in order to set up the deterministic discount function, we ﬁrst have to
formalize the idea of an inﬁnitesimal self. This involves taking the limit as the span of control of a
non-inﬁnitesimal self goes to 0. We then let λ →∞ .Instantaneous Gratification 7
3.1. The Dynamics. At any time t ≥ 0, the consumer has a stock of ﬁnancial wealth
x ≥ 0 and receives a ﬂow of labor income y>0.I fx>0, she can choose any consumption
level c>0: wealth is a stock and consumption is a ﬂow, so any ﬁnite consumption is
achievable provided it is not maintained for too long. If x =0then she can only choose
a consumption level 0 <c≤ y: she has no wealth and cannot borrow, so she cannot
consume more than her labor income. This is the liquidity constraint.
Whatever the consumer does not consume is invested in an asset, the returns on
which are distributed normally with mean μdt and variance σ2 dt,w h e r eμ ∈ (−∞,∞)
and σ ∈ (0,∞). The change in wealth is therefore
dx =( μx+ y − c)dt + σxd z,
where z is a standard Wiener process.9
3.2. Equilibrium. Recall that the consumer is modeled as a sequence of autonomous
selves (see Figure 1). Each self controls consumption during her own present and cares
about — but does not control — consumption in her future. Our consumption problem is
therefore an intrapersonal game. Following the literature in intergenerational games, our
solution concept for this game will be stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium.10
Maskin and Tirole (2001) deﬁne Markov-perfect equilibrium (or MPE for short). MPE
is a reﬁnement of subgame-perfect equilibrium which only allows strategies to depend on
information that is directly payoﬀ relevant (i.e. information that is necessary to determine
players’ choice sets or payoﬀs). It does not allow strategies to depend on information that
is only indirectly relevant (e.g. it does not allow the strategy of one player to depend on
information that only becomes relevant if the strategy of another player depends on it).
In our model, the only information that is directly payoﬀ relevant is the current level of
wealth, so MPE restricts analysis to strategies that map current wealth to consumption.11
We go further, restricting attention to stationary MPE (or SMPE for short). In other
9We could also make labor income stochastic: in addition to labor income ﬂow y, the agent receives
sporadic (i.i.d.) lump-sum bonuses. To preserve stationarity, such bonuses would arrive with a constant
hazard. We could even allow for non-stationary labor income, at the expense of an extra state variable.
These generalizations would not change our results.
10For two important examples, see Bernheim and Ray (1987) and Leininger (1986).
11In our model, the information available to self n at time t ∈ [sn,s n+1) consists of the timepath
z :[ 0 ,t] → R of past shocks, the timepath x :[ 0 ,t] → [0,∞) of past wealth, the sequence {s0,s 1,...,sn}
of past transition times, the timepath c :[ 0 ,t) → (0,∞) of past consumption and the current time. Of
all this information, only the current value of wealth xt is directly payoﬀ relevant.Instantaneous Gratification 8
words, we study equilibria in which all selves use the same strategy.
Consider self n. Suppose that the future selves n +1 ,n+2 ,... all employ the same
Markov strategy e c :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞). Then the dynamics of wealth from time sn + τn
onwards are given by
dxt =( μx t + y − e c(xt))dt + σx t dz
and the continuation value of self n is
v(xsn+τn,e c)=E sn+τn
∙Z ∞
sn+τn
e
−γ(t−(sn+τn)) u(e c(xt))dt
¸
,
where: sn+τn is the time at which control passes from self n to self n+1; xsn+τn is wealth
at time sn+τn; u :( 0 ,∞) → R is the instantaneous utility function; γ = −ln(δ) > 0 is the
long-run discount rate; and Esn+τn denotes expectations conditional on the information
available at time sn + τn.12
Suppose further that self n employs the Markov strategy c :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞).T h e n
t h ed y n a m i c so fw e a l t hf r o mt i m esn to time sn + τn are given by
dxt =( μx t + y − c(xt))dt + σx t dz
and the current value of self n is
w(xsn,c,e c)=E sn
∙Z sn+τn
sn
e
−γ(t−sn) u(c(xt))dt + βe
−γτn v(xsn+τn,e c)
¸
,
where: sn is the time at which control passes from self n − 1 to self n; xsn is wealth at
time sn;a n dEsn denotes expectations conditioned on information available at time sn.
The objective of self n is to ﬁnd a Markov strategy c∗ that is optimal in the sense that,
for all xsn ≥ 0, c∗ maximizes w(xsn,c,e c) with respect to c.13 We denote by BR(e c) the
set of all such Markov strategies c∗. An SMPE of our model is then any Markov strategy
c such that c ∈ BR(c).
3.3. Bellman System for v, w and c. An SMPE can be characterized in terms of
three functions: the equilibrium Markov strategy (or consumption function) c itself; the
associated continuation-value function v :[ 0 ,∞) → R; and the associated current-value
12Karatzas and Shreve (1991) discuss regularity conditions for stochastic diﬀerential equations.
13Given that all future selves are employing Markov strategies, a non-Markov strategy never does better
for the current self than an optimal Markov strategy.Instantaneous Gratification 9
function w :[ 0 ,∞) → R.
Since future selves use the consumption function c, the continuation-value function v
must satisfy the diﬀerential equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c) (2)
for x ∈ [0,∞), where we have suppressed the dependence of v and c on x.T h i se q u a t i o n
reﬂects the fact that the following eﬀects must sum to zero: the expected instantaneous
change in the value function (1
2 σ2 x2 v00 +( μx+ y − c)v0); the instantaneous change in
value due to discounting (−γv); and the instantaneous utility ﬂow (u(c)).
Similarly, since the current self also uses the consumption function c, and since the
continuation-value function is v, the current-value function w satisﬁes
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 w
00 +( μx+ y − c)w
0 + λ(βv− w) − γw+ u(c) (3)
for x ∈ [0,∞), where we have suppressed the dependence of v, w and c on x.T h i s
equation is very similar to equation (2). The only diﬀerences are: (i) the current-value
function w replaces the continuation-value function v; and (ii) there is an additional term
λ(βv− w),w h i c hr e ﬂects the hazard rate λ of making the transition from the present,
valued by w,t ot h ef u t u r e ,v a l u e db yβ times v.
Third, if self n behaves optimally — taking the behavior of her future selves as given —
then c will satisfy the instantaneous optimality condition
(
u0(c)=w0 if x>0
u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),w 0} if x =0
)
. (4)
Intuitively, if x>0, then there is no constraint on consumption. So consumption c
is chosen to equate the marginal utility of consumption u0(c) and the marginal value
of current wealth w0.I f x =0 , then the liquidity constraint may or may not bind: if
w0 <u 0(y), then the constraint binds, and c = y (or, equivalently, u0(c)=u0(y)); if
w0 ≥ u0(y) then the constraint does not bind, and u0(c)=w0.
Fourth, systems of second-order ordinary diﬀerential equations like (2-4) typically
require two boundary conditions. We have already supplied one boundary condition, by
requiring that equations (2-4) hold at x =0 , and not just in the interior of the wealth
space. We refer to this as the boundary condition at 0. But we need to supply a secondInstantaneous Gratification 10
boundary condition. This boundary condition has two parts: global upper bounds for v
and w, and global lower bounds for v and w. Among other things, these bounds have the
eﬀect of controlling the behavior of v and w near inﬁnity.
Let us assume temporarily that u is bounded below. Then it is easy to see that v is
bounded below by 1
γ u(0),a n dt h a tw is bounded below by
γ+βλ
γ (γ+λ) u(0).F u r t h e r m o r e v
is bounded above by the value function v of a consumer who: (i) has utility function u;
and (ii) discounts the future exponentially at rate γ.F i n a l l y ,w is bounded above by the
value function w of a consumer who: (i) has utility function e u = u+max{0,−u(0)};a n d
(ii) discounts the future exponentially at rate γ.14
Putting these observations together, we have the following characterization of equilib-
rium in the PF model.
Theorem 1. Suppose that u is bounded below. Then the consumption function
c :[ 0 ,∞) → (0,∞) is an SMPE of the PF model if and only if there is a continuation-
value function v :[ 0 ,∞) → R and a current-value function w :[ 0 ,∞) → R such that
(c,v,w) together satisfy the pair of diﬀerential equations
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c), (5)
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 w
00 +( μx+ y − c)w
0 + λ(βv− w) − γw+ u(c) (6)
for all x ∈ [0,∞), the optimality condition
(
u0(c)=w0 if x>0
u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),w 0} if x =0
)
(7)
and the global bounds
1
γ u(0) ≤ v ≤ v, (8)
γ+βλ
γ (γ+λ) u(0) ≤ w ≤ w (9)
for all x ∈ [0,∞). We refer to (5-9) as the Bellman system of the PF consumer.15
In general, the PF model can be expected to have a ﬁnite number of equilibria. Fur-
thermore, if λ is close to 0 (a dynamically consistent limit case), then equilibrium is
14This is because: (i) considering utility ﬂows in the present, we have u ≤ e u; and (ii) considering utility
ﬂows in the future, we have βu≤ β e u ≤ e u.
15In the model with the deterministic discount function ¯ D, the consumption function c is a SMPE iﬀInstantaneous Gratification 11
unique. Similarly, if β is close to 1 (another dynamically consistent limit case), then
equilibrium is again unique. Much more interestingly, if λ is close to ∞ (a dynamically
inconsistent limit case), then equilibrium is unique. This is the case that we study next.
4. The Instantaneous-Gratification Model
Experimental evidence suggests that the present — in other words, the interval [sn,s n+τn)
during which consumption is not down-weighted by β —i ss h o r t . 16 T h i si st h es a m ea s
saying that λ is large, since the arrival rate of the future is λ. In the current section,
we consider the limiting case λ →∞ , which serves as an approximation of situations in
which the duration of the present (namely τ)i ss h o r t . W er e f e rt ot h el i m i t i n gc a s ea s
the instantaneous-gratiﬁcation model, or IG model.
In Section 6 we show that λ →∞is a good approximation for λ ≥ 12. In other words,
if time is measured in years and the average duration of the present is less than a month,
then the IG model (λ →∞ ) is a good approximation for the PF model (with λ ≥ 12).
T h e r ea r et w ow a y st od e r i v et h eI Gm o d e l . T h eﬁrst way is to derive the Bellman
equation of the IG consumer by taking the limit of the Bellman system of the PF consumer
as λ →∞ . This explicitly links the PF model and the IG model. Moreover, deﬁning an
equilibrium concept as the set of limit points of equilibria in a neighborhood of games is
t h e r ei sav a l u ef u n c t i o nV such that (c,V ) jointly satisfy the partial diﬀerential equation
0=1
2 σ2 x2 ∂2V
∂x2 (t,x)+( μx+ y − c(x)) ∂V
∂x(t,x)+ ¯ D(t)u(c(x)) + ∂V
∂t (t,x),
the optimality conditions
½
u0(c(x)) = ∂V
∂x(0,x) if x>0
u0(c(x)) = max
©
u0(y), ∂V
∂x(0,x)
ª
if x =0
¾
and the global bounds ¡R ∞
t
¯ D(s)ds
¢
u(0) ≤ V (t,x) ≤ V (t,x).
for all (t,x) ∈ [0,∞)2. Here: V (t,x) is the value at time 0 of consumption over the interval [t,∞) when
ﬁnancial wealth is x; ∂V
∂x(0,x) is the marginal value of wealth at time 0 when ﬁnancial wealth is x;a n d
V is the value function of a time-consistent consumer with discount function ¯ D. We refer to this as the
Bellman system of the ¯ D consumer. It is valid for general ¯ D.H o w e v e r ,i f¯ D(t)=e−λtδ
t+(1−e−λt)βδ
t as
in the text, then there is a solution (c,V ) in which V (t,x) takes the form e−λtδ
t w(x)+(1−e−λt)βδ
t v(x)
iﬀ (c,v,w) satisﬁes the Bellman system of the PF consumer. In other words: any solution of the Bellman
system of the PF consumer generates a solution of the Bellman system of the ¯ D consumer; but the
possibility remains that the Bellman system of the ¯ D consumer has other solutions.
16For example, McClure et al (2007) estimate a 50% discount rate over the course of an hour for
food/drink rewards. In most intertemporal choice studies, sharp short-run discounting (at least 10%
and usually much more) is observed at horizons of hours and days (e.g., see Ainslie 1992, Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002).Instantaneous Gratification 12
a technique with precedents (e.g., trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and proper equilib-
rium).17 The second way is to derive the Bellman equation of the IG consumer directly
from an analysis of her objective. This has the advantage that it generates intuitive in-
sights into the logic of the IG model. We describe the ﬁrst approach — taking the limit of
the Bellman system of the PF consumer — here. For the alternative approach, see Online
Appendix E.
Suppose the triple (cλ,v λ,w λ) solves the Bellman system of the PF consumer (for a
given value of λ). In particular,
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00
λ +( μx+ y − cλ)v
0
λ − γv λ + u(cλ),( 1 0 )
1
γ u(0) ≤ vλ ≤ v (11)
for all x ∈ [0,∞),a n d
(
u0(cλ)=w0
λ if x>0
u0(cλ)=m a x {u0(y),w 0
λ} if x =0
)
. (12)
Moving to a subsequence if necessary, suppose further that vλ and wλ (along with their
ﬁrst and second derivatives) and cλ converge to limiting functions v and w (along with
their ﬁrst and second derivatives) and c.18 Then the equations characterizing (c,v,w) can
be derived as follows.
Note ﬁrst that equation (10) does not depend directly on λ. This equation only applies
17For example, in the case of trembling-hand perfection, one ﬁnds the set of all Nash equilibria of an
ε-perturbed version of the original game; and then one ﬁnds the set of limit points of these equilibria as
ε goes to 0. In the case of the IG model, one ﬁnds the set of all SMPE of the game with ﬁnite λ;a n d
then one ﬁnds the set of limit points of these equilibria as λ goes to ∞.
18A rigorous proof of the fact that vλ and wλ converge in this way is beyond the scope of the current
paper. However, we oﬀer the following motivation for the mathematically minded reader. First, it can
be shown that c is never inﬁnite. Hence equations (5) and (6) are non-degenerate quasilinear elliptic
diﬀerential equations in (0,∞). Second, inequalities (8) and (9) show that the sets V = {vλ | λ ∈ [0,∞)}
and W = {wλ | λ ∈ [0,∞)} are equibounded. Third, combining the ﬁrst and second observations, we
see that V and W are precompact in the space C
2,1
loc((0,∞)) of functions which, along with their ﬁrst and
second derivatives, are Lipschitz continuous on compact subsets of (0,∞). Passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we therefore conclude that ∃ v,w ∈ C
2,1
loc((0,∞)) s.t. vλ → v and wλ → w (both in C
2,1
loc((0,∞)))
as λ →∞ . Fourth, the convergence of cλ (which lies in C
1,1
loc((0,∞))) can be deduced from that of w0
λ
(which likewise lies in C
1,1
loc((0,∞)))b yi n v e r t i n gt h eﬁrst-order condition u0(cλ)=w0
λ. W ed e n o t et h e
limit of cλ by c. Fifth, it can be shown, that the appropriate boundary conditions (which do not involve
second derivatives) also hold. Finally, we show below that the Bellman system of the IG consumer has
a unique solution. Hence the limit point (c,v,w) is unique. Hence, (cλ,v λ,w λ) converges (and not just
along a suitably chosen subsequence).Instantaneous Gratification 13
after the transition to the future has taken place, so it is not aﬀected by the arrival rate
of the future. Letting λ →∞therefore preserves the form of (10), yielding
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c) (13)
for all x ∈ [0,∞). In other words, just as vλ was the expected present discounted value
obtained when consumption was chosen according to the exogenously given consumption
function cλ,s ov is the expected present discounted value obtained when consumption is
chosen according to the exogenously given consumption function c.
Second, wλ − βv λ is the value function of a consumer who: (i) has utility function
(1−β)u; (ii) discounts the future exponentially at rate γ+λ; and (iii) has the exogenously
given consumption function cλ.19 Hence wλ − βv λ → 0 as λ →∞ .20 In particular,
w = βv (14)
for all x ∈ [0,∞).
Third, like equation (10), equation (12) does not depend directly on λ. Letting λ →∞
therefore preserves the form of this equation, yielding
(
u0(c)=w0 if x>0
u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),w 0} if x =0
)
. (15)
Just as cλ was the optimal consumption function when the current-value function was wλ,
so c is the optimal consumption function when the current-value function is w.
Fourth, passing to the limit in equation (11), we obtain the global bounds
1
γ u(0) ≤ v ≤ v (16)
19Note that wλ is obtained by discounting back to time s0 the utility ﬂow u(cλ) during the span of
control of self 0, and the utility ﬂow βu (cλ) during the spans of control of selves 1, 2, .... Similarly, vλ is
obtained by discounting back to time s1 the utility ﬂow u(cλ) during the span of control of self 1,a n dt h e
utility ﬂow u(cλ) during the spans of control of selves 2, 3, .... However, vλ could just as well be obtained
by discounting back to time s0 the utility ﬂow u(cλ) during the span of control of self 0, and the utility
ﬂow u(cλ) during the spans of control of selves 1, 2, .... Subtracting β times this latter utility ﬂow from
the utility ﬂow for wλ,w es e et h a twλ − βv λ is obtained by discounting back to time s0 the utility ﬂow
(1−β)u(cλ) during the span of control of self 0, and the utility ﬂow 0 during the span of control of selves
1, 2, .... That is, wλ − βv λ is the value function described in the text.
20The assumption that u is bounded below is used here. It implies that wλ − βv λ ≥
1−β
γ+λ u(0).Instantaneous Gratification 14
for all x ∈ [0,∞). However, economic intuition suggests that the diﬀerent selves should
be able to overcome the coordination problem among themselves, at least to the extent
of obtaining a minimum ﬂow utility of u(y) instead of u(0). This intuition is vindicated
by the following lemma, which allows us to replace (16) with the tighter
1
γ u(y) ≤ v ≤ v (17)
for all x ∈ [0,∞), and which is important for our theory.
Lemma 2. Suppose that u is bounded below. Then v ≥ 1
γ u(y).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Taken together, equations (13-15) and (17) constitute the Bellman system of the IG
consumer. Eliminating w from this system, we arrive at the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3. The Bellman equation of the IG consumer consists of the diﬀerential
equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx+ y − c)v
0 − γv+ u(c) (18)
for all x ∈ [0,∞), the optimality condition
(
u0(c)=βv 0 if x>0
u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),βv0} if x =0
)
(19)
and the global bounds
1
γ u(y) ≤ v ≤ v (20)
for all x ∈ [0,∞).21
Notice that the Bellman equation of the IG consumer diﬀers from the Bellman equation
of an exponential consumer with utility function u and discount rate γ only in that the
21In order to give a mathematically complete deﬁnition, we need to say what we mean by a solution
of the Bellman equation of the IG consumer. From a mathematical point of view, the best answer is
‘a viscosity solution’. This is because the equation is degenerate, in the sense that the coeﬃcient of
v00 (namely 1
2 σ2 x2) tends to 0 as x tends to 0. However, from a practical point of view, a perfectly
satisfactory answer is ‘a classical solution’. This is because: (i) any classical solution is a fortiori a
viscosity solution; (ii) as Theorem 5 below shows, the Bellman equation of the IG consumer has a unique
viscosity solution; and (iii) this unique viscosity solution is in fact twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and
therefore a classical solution. For an introduction to viscosity solutions, and an explanation of their
relationship to classical solutions, see Crandall et al (1992).Instantaneous Gratification 15
marginal value of (future) wealth v0 is multiplied by the factor β in the optimality condition
(19). Furthermore the former reduces to the latter if we put β =1 . The presence of the
multiplicative β term is a slight variation on the usual form of the Envelope Theorem.
This “new” Envelope Theorem is quite natural since the future arrives instantaneously,
and the future has continuation value βv. Hence the marginal value of wealth is βv 0.
This tells us two things. First, the liquidity constraint binds iﬀ x =0and βv 0 <u 0(y),i n
which case c = y (or, equivalently, u0(c)=u0(y)). Second, if the liquidity constraint does
not bind, then the current self sets consumption in such a way that u0(c)=βv 0.
Notice too that, while both our characterization of equilibrium in the PF model in
terms of the Bellman system of the PF consumer, and our derivation of the Bellman
equation of the IG consumer from the Bellman system of the PF consumer, used the
assumption that u is bounded below, the Bellman equation of the IG consumer as such
makes economic and mathematical sense whether or not u is bounded below.22 This raises
the question whether it is possible to derive the IG model when u is not bounded below.
Note ﬁrst that this question relates to the behavior of equilibria of the PF model
when λ is large. In the following discussion, we therefore restrict attention to λ ∈ Λ =
[max{0,μ−γ},∞). Note second that, whether or not u is bounded below, the PF model
possesses equilibria in which wλ is bounded below. We call such equilibria “well-behaved”.
Furthermore, if u is bounded below, then all equilibria are well-behaved. Third, in any
well-behaved equilibrium, we have wλ ≥ wλ =
γ+βλ
γ (γ+λ) u(y). In other words, if wλ is
bounded below, then it is bounded below by the speciﬁcq u a n t i t ywλ.F o u r t h ,wλ is itself
bounded below on Λ (by min{1
γ u(y),
β
γ u(y)}).
Armed with this extra information, the discussion above adapts easily to show that,
moving to a subsequence if necessary, any sequence of well-behaved solutions of the Bell-
man system of the PF consumer converges, as λ →∞ , to a solution of the Bellman
equation of the IG consumer.
The only catch is that, when u is not bounded below, there exist equilibria for which
wλ(0) = −∞.23 We call such equilibria “pathological”. For example, if u is not bounded
below, then the PF model admits a pathological equilibrium in which the consumption
function is 0. The mathematical logic behind this equilibrium is that, because future
22The global bounds (8-9) in the PF model involve u(0), which is negatively inﬁnite if u is unbounded
below, whereas the global bounds (20) in the IG model involve u(y), which is bounded since y>0.
23Note that wλ must be non-decreasing. This is because the current self has access to what is, eﬀectively,
a free-disposal technology: she can consume at an arbitrarily high rate. Hence the only way in which wλ
can fail to be bounded below is if wλ(0) = −∞.Instantaneous Gratification 16
selves consume at rate 0, the continuation value of the current self will be −∞,n om a t t e r
what she does. Hence her current value will be −∞, no matter what she does. Hence
she may as well consume 0 too. This mathematical logic ﬂies in the face of the intuitive
logic of the situation: consuming nothing is the last thing that the current self should be
doing, since by doing so she is passing on resources to selves who will never use them.
Overall, it makes sense to rule out the pathological equilibria and focus on the well-
behaved equilibria. These always exist. Moreover, moving to a subsequence if necessary,
they converge to an equilibrium of the IG model. Finally, as we show below, equilibrium
is unique in the IG model. Hence no subsequence is in fact necessary: the well-behaved
equilibria converge to the equilibrium of the IG model.
5. Existence, Uniqueness and Value-Function Equivalence
In this section we show that the value function of the IG consumer exists and is unique.
To prove this, we use a key intermediate result. We describe an alternative consumer with
dynamically consistent preferences and a slightly altered utility function b u.W es h o wt h a t
a value function v solves the Bellman equation of the IG consumer if and only if it solves
the Bellman equation of this dynamically consistent “b u consumer”. We call this result
“value-function equivalence”. We also emphasize that value-function equivalence is not
the same as observational equivalence, and indeed that observational equivalence does not
hold: the consumption function of the IG consumer is not the same as the consumption
function of the b u consumer.
V a l u e - f u n c t i o ne q u i v a l e n c ei m p l i e sb o t ht h ee x i s t e n c ea n dt h eu n i q u e n e s so ft h ev a l u e
function of the IG consumer, for the simple reason that the b u consumer solves an opti-
mization problem, and the value function of an optimization problem always exists and
is unique. Uniqueness is the most important property of the IG model: the IG model
resolves the multiplicity problem that has plagued the literature on dynamically incon-
sistent preferences. The current section also discusses a number of other issues, including
the extension of the uniqueness result to the deterministic version of our model (in which
asset returns are non-stochastic).
5.1. Assumptions. Before proceeding further, we introduce the simple assumptions
on which the analysis in the rest of the paper will be based:
A1 u(c)=
(
1
1−ρ (c1−ρ − 1) if ρ 6=1
ln(c) if ρ =1
)
;Instantaneous Gratification 17
A2 1 − β<ρ ;
A3 μ<μ,w h e r eμ =
(
1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 if ρ<1
∞ if ρ ≥ 1
)
.
Assumption A1 is standard: u has constant relative risk aversion ρ.24 Assumption A2
ensures that the dynamic inconsistency of the IG consumer (as measured by 1 − β)i s
less than the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.25 This inequality would be satisﬁed in
a standard calibration: empirical estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ρ
typically lie between 1
2 and 5; and the short-run discount factor β is typically thought to
lie between 1
2 and 1.26 Assumption A3 is a one-sided (hence weaker) version of a standard
integrability assumption.27 It ensures that the consumer’s expected lifetime utility is not
positively inﬁnite even when the utility function is unbounded above (i.e. ρ ≤ 1). It
achieves this by ensuring that wealth does not grow too fast.28
In fact, the assumption of constant relative risk aversion is more restrictive than
it needs to be (simplifying exposition). We could instead assume only that the utility
function has bounded relative risk aversion and bounded relative prudence: in other
words, relative risk aversion and relative prudence vary with consumption. This general
case is analyzed in an earlier working paper (Harris and Laibson 2000), and the argument
is summarized in Online Appendix H.
5.2. The Utility Function b u. The new utility function b u depends not only on con-
sumption b c, but also on wealth x:w h e n x>0, b u(b c,x)=b u+(b c);b u tw h e nx =0 ,
b u(b c,x)=b u0(b c). In other words, the wealth-dependent utility function b u is made up of
two wealth-independent utility functions b u+ :( 0 ,∞) → R and b u0 :( 0 ,y] → R,w i t hb u+
24Notice that Assumptions A1-A3 do not imply that u is bounded below. This is because the analysis
which follows takes the Bellman equation of the IG consumer (namely (18-20)) as its starting point, and
neither this equation nor our analysis of it depends on u being bounded below.
25The case 1 − β>ρcan also be analyzed. Now the consumer’s desire to consume immediately (as
measured by 1 − β) outweighs her desire to smooth consumption (as measured by ρ). The current self
therefore consumes all her ﬁnancial wealth during her instant of control, forcing all subsequent selves to
consume only their labor income y.S i n c e
u(c)
c → 0 as c →∞ , this burst of consumption by the current
self contributes nothing to the integral of lifetime utility. The value function is therefore v = 1
γ u(y).
(Notice that v0 =0 .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ei n ﬁnite consumption rate.)
26See Laibson et al (1998) and Ainslie (1992).
27In the model with y =0and β =1 ,i ti ss t a n d a r dt oa s s u m eγ>(1 − ρ)(μ − 1
2 ρσ2).T h i sc a nb e
divided into two parts: μ< 1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 if ρ<1;a n dμ> 1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 if ρ>1.W e a l t hm u s tn o t
rise too fast when u is unbounded above; and must not fall too fast when u is unbounded below.
28We do not need the other side of the standard assumption, which is designed to ensure that expected
lifetime utility is not negatively inﬁnite, because we assume y>0.Instantaneous Gratification 18
being used to evaluate consumption when wealth is positive, and b u0 being used to evaluate
consumption when wealth is zero. The utility function b u+ is simply a rescaling of u.I ti s
given by the formula
b u+(b c)=
ψ
β u( 1
ψ b c)+
ψ−1
β for b c ∈ (0,∞),
where
ψ =
ρ − (1 − β)
ρ
.
(Notice that, under our assumptions, ψ ∈ (0,1).) The utility function b u0 coincides with
b u+ for b c ∈ (0,ψy), and with the tangent to b u+ at ψyfor b c ∈ [ψy,y].29
The relationship between u, b u+ and b u0 is plotted in Figure 4, using the parameter
values β = 2
3, ρ = 3
4 and y =1 .N o t i c e t h a t b u+(b c) <u (b c) for all b c ∈ (0,∞) and
b u0(b c) <u (b c) for all b c ∈ (0,y). This makes sense: the b u consumer optimizes fully, while
the IG consumer does not. Hence the b u consumer must be suitably handicapped in order
to prevent her from achieving a higher value than the IG consumer. Notice too that
b u0(y)=u(y). Once again this makes sense: in the liquidity constrained case, both the b u
consumer and the IG consumer consume their labor income y forever. So we must have
b u0(y)=u(y) if they are both to obtain the same value.
5.3. Value-Function Equivalence. The b u consumer is a consumer who: (i) has the
utility function b u; (ii) faces the same wealth dynamics as the IG consumer; and (iii)
discounts the future exponentially at rate γ.
Theorem 4 [Value-Function Equivalence]. v is a value function of the IG consumer iﬀ v
is a value function of the b u consumer.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The b u consumer has both conventional and unconventional features. On the conven-
tional side, she discounts exponentially (at rate γ), so she has dynamically consistent
preferences. On the unconventional side, her utility function depends on her ﬁnancial
wealth x.W h e nx>0, her utility function is b u+.W h e nx =0 ,i ti sb u0. This unconven-
tional wealth-dependence is needed to generate value-function equivalence.
Using the Value-Function Equivalence Theorem, we can reduce the study of the prob-
lem of the IG consumer, which is game-theoretic, to the study of the problem of the b u
29I.e. b u0(b c)=b u+(b c) for b c ∈ (0,ψy],a n db u0(b c)=b u+(ψy)+( b c − ψy)b u0
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consumer, which is decision-theoretic (i.e. non-strategic). There is, however, an impor-
tant caveat: while the value function of the IG consumer coincides with value function
of the b u c o n s u m e r ,i ti sn o tt h ec a s et h a tt h econsumption function of the IG consumer
coincides with the consumption function of the b u consumer. In particular, value-function
equivalence does not translate into observational equivalence in behavior.30
From the Value-Function Equivalence Theorem, it is easy to deduce the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium in the IG model:
Theorem 5 [Existence and Uniqueness]. The IG model has a unique equilibrium.
The intuition for this result follows. First, optimization problems have unique value
functions, since there cannot be two state-contingent values that are both best values.
Hence, the b u consumer — who is an optimizer — must have a unique value function.
Second, the set of possible value functions of the b u consumer coincides with the set of
possible solutions of her Bellman equation. Hence the Bellman equation of the b u consumer
has a unique solution, namely her value function. Third, the Bellman equation of the IG
consumer is identical to the Bellman equation of the b u consumer. Hence the Bellman
equation of the IG consumer likewise has a unique solution, and this solution is the value
function of the b u consumer. Finally, one can use this common value function to derive
both the equilibrium policy function of the IG consumer, which is unique,a n dt h eo p t i m a l
policy function of the b u consumer, which is diﬀerent from that of the IG consumer, and
which is not necessarily unique.31
Proof. See Appendix C.
5.4. The Deterministic Case: A Reﬁnement. Until now we have assumed that
the standard deviation of asset returns is strictly positive (σ>0). In other words, we
have been studying the stochastic IG model. In the present subsection, we discuss the
deterministic IG model (σ =0 ).
30For a detailed exploration of the relationship between c and b c, see footnote 31 below and Online
Appendix G.7.
31For the IG consumer, equilibrium consumption is generated by the ﬁrst-order condition u0(c)=βv 0
if x>0 and u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),βv0} if x =0 ;a n df o rt h eb u consumer, optimal consumption is generated
by the ﬁrst-order condition b u0
+(b c)=v0 if x>0 and b u0
0(b c)=m a x {b u0
0(y),v0} if x =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
it follows directly from the deﬁnition of b u+ that b u0
+(b c)= 1
β u0( 1
ψ b c). Hence, when x>0,w eh a v e
u0(c)=βv 0 = β b u0
+(b c)=u0( 1
ψ b c) or b c = ψc.I n p a r t i c u l a r , b c is diﬀerent from c.F u r t h e r m o r e , i f
v0(0) = b u0
0(y) (a situation that arises iﬀ μ = μ1), then b c c a nt a k eo na n yv a l u ei nt h ei n t e r v a l[ψy,y] and
is not therefore unique.Instantaneous Gratification 20
We begin by deﬁning the Bellman equation of the deterministic IG consumer. We
then note that — as in the stochastic case — the Bellman equation of the deterministic
IG consumer is identical to the Bellman equation of the deterministic b u consumer. The
Value-Function Equivalence Theorem therefore holds for the deterministic IG model. In
particular, the deterministic IG model has a unique value function. This result is signiﬁ-
cant, because it provides a way of resolving concerns that deterministic hyperbolic models
may have a continuum of equilibria (cf. Krusell and Smith (2000), Ekeland and Lazrak
(2006, 2010), and Karp (2007)).32 It eliminates not just the possibility of a continuum of
value functions, but even the possibility a ﬁnite multiplicity of value functions.
Next, in order to unify our deterministic and stochastic results, we show that the
value function of the deterministic IG consumer is the limit of the value function of the
stochastic IG consumer as noise converges to zero (σ ↓ 0). This implies that the value
function of the deterministic IG consumer is precisely the value function that would be
selected by a ‘trembling-hand’ analysis.33 In other words, uniqueness in the deterministic
IG model can be understood as a reﬁnement result.
Finally, the deterministic model is tractable: the Bellman equation of the determin-
istic IG consumer can be transformed into an autonomous ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equa-
tion, whereas the Bellman equation of the stochastic IG consumer is a second-order non-
autonomous diﬀerential equation. An earlier draft of this paper, Harris and Laibson
(2000), expands on these points and provides a complete characterization of the value
and policy functions of the deterministic case.
Turning now to the details, the ﬁrst step is to deﬁne the Bellman equation of the
deterministic IG consumer. In Deﬁnition 3 above, we deﬁned the Bellman equation of the
IG consumer for the case σ>0.D e ﬁnition 3 can therefore be thought of as the deﬁnition
of the Bellman equation of the stochastic IG consumer. We deﬁne the Bellman equation
32Like our paper, these papers are all continuous-time models and they all study discount functions that
are not exponential. However, there are some diﬀerences: (i) their models are embedded in a deterministic
economy and ours is in a stochastic economy (stochasticity smooths the value function and is also critical
for our characterization and global uniqueness results); (ii) our model sets up a present-future dichotomy
with a stochastic transition from one to the other (the stochastic transition makes the problem stationary,
improving tractability); (iii) ﬁnally, these papers emphasize that multiple equilibria exist, whereas our
key result is to show how to set up the model to obtain a unique equilibrium.
33There is a close analogy between using the limit as σ ↓ 0 to identify a unique equilibrium of the
deterministic IG model and using trembling-hand perfection to reﬁne the set of Nash equilibria of a ﬁnite
game. In our case, the stochasticity of asset returns ensures that, starting from any interior state, every
other interior state will be reached with positive probability. In the case of trembling-hand perfection,
trembles ensure that all successor nodes of the game are reached with positive probability.Instantaneous Gratification 21
of the deterministic IG consumer by putting σ =0everywhere in Deﬁnition 3.34
The second step is to demonstrate that value-function equivalence holds:35
Theorem 6 [Value-Function Equivalence]. v is a value function of the deterministic IG
consumer iﬀ v is a value function of the deterministic b u consumer. ¥
From this in turn we obtain uniqueness:
Theorem 7 [Existence and Uniqueness]. The deterministic IG model has a unique value
function. ¥
The fourth step is to unify our deterministic and stochastic results:
Theorem 8. For all σ>0,l e tvσ be the value function of the stochastic IG consumer;
and let v be the value function of the deterministic IG consumer. Then vσ → v uniformly
on compact subsets of [0,∞) as σ ↓ 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Remark. Assumptions A1 and A2 do not involve the parameter σ, and Assumption A3
becomes more restrictive as σ decreases. For the analysis of this section, it therefore
suﬃces to use the special case of Assumption A3 in which σ =0 .
6. The Consumption Function when y =0
In the current section, we begin the analysis of the consumption function by studying the
limit cases of the IG model and the PF model in which there is no labor income.36 The
case y =0is useful for three reasons. First, both the IG model (in which λ →∞and
the present lasts only an instant) and the PF model (in which λ<∞ and the present
has strictly positive duration) become highly tractable when y =0 : the value and policy
functions corresponding to the unique equilibrium are linear in wealth; and closed-form
34As in the case of the Bellman equation of the stochastic IG consumer, we need to say what we mean
b yas o l u t i o no ft h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o no ft h ed e t e r m inistic IG consumer. This time there is only one
possible answer: ‘a viscosity solution’. This is because, for μ ∈ (γ, 1
β γ ), the unique solution of the
equation has a convex kink. In particular, it is not a classical solution. For an introduction to viscosity
solutions, and an explanation of their relationship to classical solutions, see Crandall et al (1992).
35Following math convention, we use a solid box, ¥, to signify that a theorem is stated without proof.
36The paper focuses on the case y>0.T h ec a s ey =0is analyzed only in the present section. The
two cases involve diﬀerent considerations, and are treated separately.Instantaneous Gratification 22
expressions can be found for both functions. Second, models in which policy functions are
linear in wealth are often used as benchmarks in the economics literature (for example,
Merton 1971, Barro 1999, Luttmer and Marriotti 2003). Third, we can use the case y =0
to study the relationship between the IG model and the PF model. Empirical evidence
suggests that present bias aﬀects utility ﬂows in the immediate present (i.e., the current
w e e k ,d a y ,o re v e nh o u r )a n dd o e sn o ta ﬀect utility ﬂows that will come a few weeks or
months from now (e.g., McClure et al 2007). Hence, present bias describes a person who
wishes to break their diet today but keep the diet starting tomorrow, or a student who
prefers to take today oﬀ but get back to work tomorrow. Hence, present bias applies for
λ ' 365.U s i n gt h ec a s ey =0 ,w es h o wt h a tλ →∞is a good approximation for all λ
values in the interval [12,∞), which subsumes the empirically relevant interval [365,∞).
6.1. The PF Model with y =0 . To analyze the PF model with y =0 ,w em a k e
two assumptions that diﬀer from the y>0 case. First, we focus exclusively on equilibria
in linear consumption functions. This allows us to dispense with the global upper and
lower bounds. Second, we need to strengthen Assumption A3 (which requires that μ<
1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 when ρ<1) by requiring in addition that μ> 1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 when ρ>1.37
The Bellman system of the PF model with y =0is simpler than that of the PF
consumer with y>0. It consists of the pair of diﬀerential equations
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx− c)v
0 − γv+ u(c), (21)
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 w
00 +( μx− c)w
0 + λ(βv− w) − γw+ u(c) (22)
for all x>0, and the optimality condition
u
0(c)=w
0, (23)
again for all x>0. In particular, we no longer require that the diﬀerential equations or
the optimality conditions hold at x =0 , and we no longer require the global bounds.
It is natural to look for a solution to equations (21-23) in the form
v(x)=Θu(θx),w (x)=Φu(φx),c (x)=αx,
where the constants Θ, Φ, θ, φ and α are all required to be strictly positive. Making this
37Cf. footnotes 27 and 28.Instantaneous Gratification 23
substitution leads to the following quadratic equation for α:
0=
λ
1+λ
((ρ + β − 1) α − e γ)+
1
1+λ
¡
ρ(1 − ρ)α
2 +( 2ρ − 1)e γα− e γ
2¢
, (24)
where
e γ = γ − (1 − ρ)(μ − 1
2 ρσ
2).
S e eO n l i n eA p p e n d i xFf o rd e t a i l s .F u r t h e r m o r ei tc a nb es h o w nt h a to n l yo n eo ft h et w o
solutions of this quadratic is relevant. This solution is always positive, varying from
h γ
ρ
when λ =0to
h γ
ρ−(1−β) when λ = ∞.38
A more concrete understanding of this solution, and especially of its behavior as λ →
∞, can be obtained by taking expansions in λ
−1. Indeed, we have
α =
˜ γ
ρ + β − 1
−
(1 − β)β ˜ γ2
(ρ + β − 1)3 λ
−1 +O
¡
λ
−2¢
.
The ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increasing λ i st h e r e f o r et oi n c r e a s et h ea v e r a g ep r o p e n s i t yt o
consume. A higher value of λ implies that the multiplicative β-discounting associated
with the passage to the future arrives more quickly. More discounting lowers the value of
future consumption, thereby raising the propensity to consume today.
6.2. The IG Model with y =0 . To analyze the IG model with y =0we make
two assumptions that diﬀer from the y>0 case (mirroring our approach with the PF
model). First, we focus on equilibria in linear consumption functions. Second, we need
to strengthen Assumption A3 by requiring that μ> 1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 when ρ>1.
The Bellman equation of the IG consumer with y =0consists of the equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx− c)v
0 − γv+ u(c) (25)
and the optimality condition
u
0(c)=βv
0, (26)
both for all x>0.
This equation can be solved using the same methods as in Section 6.1. We look for
v(x)=Θu(θx),c (x)=αx,
38Assumption A2 implies that ρ − (1 − β) > 0, and Assumption A3 implies that e γ>0.Instantaneous Gratification 24
where the constants Θ, θ and α are all required to be strictly positive. Making this
substitution leads to the conclusion that
α =
e γ
ρ + β − 1
, (27)
where e γ = γ − (1 − ρ)(μ − 1
2 ρσ2) as before.39
It is easy to see that the right-hand side of equation (27) is the limit of the relevant
solution of equation (24) as λ →∞ . Hence the policy function of the PF model converges,
as λ →∞ , to the policy function of the IG model. It can also be shown, as one would
expect in the light of the convergence of the policy functions, that the value function of
the PF model converges to the value function of the IG model as λ →∞ .
Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) analyze continuous-time economies
with a general class of dynamically-inconsistent time preferences. In the economic envi-
ronments studied in these two papers linear policy rules always support an equilibrium
and the authors restrict attention to equilibria in this class.
Barro’s deterministic economy has returns that vary over time due to aggregate growth
dynamics, whereas our stochastic economy has returns that are i.i.d. For the log utility
case (ρ =1 ), the propensity to consume in our economy is α =
γ
β, which matches the
propensity to consume that Barro derives for log utility when converging to the continuous
time analog of the quasi-hyperbolic discount function.
Like Barro, Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) study a range of time preferences, includ-
ing the continuous-time analog of the quasi-hyperbolic discount function. Unlike Barro,
Luttmer and Mariotti study a stochastic endowment economy, which they use to charac-
terize asset prices.
The IG model diﬀers from Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) in that our
analysis is valid whether the equilibrium policies are linear or non-linear. For example,
the IG model can handle liquidity constraints, other forms of market incompleteness and
utility functions outside of the constant relative risk aversion class. In addition, we obtain
uniqueness for both the y =0and y>0 versions of the IG model without restricting the
class of policy functions.
6.3. Calibration of the y =0Cases. We now provide a calibration of the y =0
models. For this calibration we ﬁx the parameters γ =0 .05, β = 2
3, σ =0 .17 and
39We also obtain Θ = 1
γ and θ
1−ρ =
γα
1−ρ
˜ γ+(1−ρ)α.Instantaneous Gratification 25
μ =0 .06.40 We then vary the value of risk aversion (ρ) and the hazard rate at which the
future arrives (λ). This calibration identiﬁes the range of λ for which the y =0cases of
the PF model and the IG model have quantitatively similar policy functions.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate the marginal propensity to consume for the PF model for
λ ∈
©
0, 1
10, 1, 12, 52, 365, ∞
ª
.A tλ =0 , the future never arrives; at λ =5 2 ,t h ef u t u r e
arrives on average once a week; and at λ = ∞, the future arrives instantaneously. We
believe that the appropriate calibration is λ =3 6 5 , implying that the psychological future
arrives on average once per day.
ρ = 1
2 ρ =1 ρ =2 ρ =5
λ =0 0.0472 0.0500 0.0405 0.000200
λ = 1
10 0.0797 0.0643 0.0463 0.000214
λ =1 0.123 0.0733 0.0484 0.000214
λ =1 2 0.140 0.0748 0.0486 0.000214
λ =5 2 0.141 0.0750 0.0487 0.000214
λ =3 6 5 0.142 0.0750 0.0487 0.000214
λ = ∞ 0.142 0.0750 0.0487 0.000214
Table 1: The marginal propensity to consume as a function of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion (ρ) and the arrival rate of the future (λ).
Recall that the IG model is the case λ →∞ . Table 1 shows that the IG model is a
good approximation for the PF model as long as λ ≥ 12. In other words, the IG model is
a good approximation of the PF model as long as the present lasts on average about one
month or less.
7. The Consumption Function when y>0
We now turn to the more challenging case with non-zero labor income. For this case,
the PF model is not analytically tractable, and we therefore focus exclusively on the IG
model. Three general properties emerge. We ﬁrst provide an overview of these properties
before delving into the details.
First, the consumption function is continuously diﬀerentiable in the interior of the
wealth space. This is a consequence of Brownian motion in the wealth process. Brownian
40These are standard calibration values based either on historical data (σ,μ) or parameter estimates
(γ,β). See Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2011).Instantaneous Gratification 26
motion makes the value function twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and thereby elimi-
nates discontinuities in the consumption function. More formally, optimality implies that
u0(c)=βv 0 when x>0. Diﬀerentiating this expression yields u00(c)c0 = βv 00. Twice con-
tinuous diﬀerentiability of the value function therefore implies continuous diﬀerentiability
of the consumption function when x>0.41
Second, if the expected rate of return μ is low enough, the consumption function will
have an upward discontinuity when wealth x =0 .I n t u i t i v e l y ,i fμ is low, then the liquidity
constraint binds at x =0 ;b u t ,e v e nw h e nμ is low, it cannot bind at any strictly positive
x (no matter how small) since x is a stock and c is a ﬂow. The sudden arrival of a binding
liquidity constraint as x falls from any strictly positive value to 0 causes a downward jump
in c from c(0+) = c>yto c(0) = y. Moreover this downward jump can be understood
in terms of the consumer’s propensity to value immediate rewards discretely more than
delayed rewards. It does not arise when μ is suﬃciently high, since in that case the
liquidity constraint does not bind at x =0 .
Third, it can happen that there is an interval over which the consumption function
is downward sloping. This occurs if the expected rate of return μ takes on intermediate
values. However, this non-monotonicity disappears when a bond is introduced, and the
investor can take both long and short positions in the bond. We therefore view the ﬁrst
two properties as robust implications of the IG model, and the third property as an
artefact of the bond-free model that we study in the present paper.
These properties of the IG model contrast with the properties of the continuous-time
exponential model, the consumption function of which is continuous everywhere, including
at x =0where the liquidity constraint starts to bind, and monotonic for all choices of μ.
The properties of the IG model also contrast with the properties of the discrete-time quasi-
hyperbolic model, the consumption function of which may have several downward sloping
regions and a countable number of downward jumps.42 (Cf. Morris and Postlewaite 1997,
Krusell and Smith 2000, Harris and Laibson 2001, Morris 2002.)
7.1. Comparative Statics on μ. In order to simplify our description of the behavior
of the consumption function, we vary the expected rate of return μ a n dh o l dt h eo t h e r
41A deeper analysis shows that the value function is actually inﬁnitely diﬀerentiable on the whole wealth
space (including the boundary). However, if the liquidity constraint binds, then this only translates into
inﬁnite diﬀerentiability of the consumption function in the interior of the wealth space, because in this
case the consumption function is discontinuous at 0.
42Downward sloping regions and jumps are not eliminated by adding a bond to the discrete-time model.Instantaneous Gratification 27
parameters ﬁxed. It turns out that there are three qualitative cases to consider.
Recall that Assumption A3 requires that μ<μ,w h e r eμ = 1
1−ρ γ + 1
2 ρσ2 if ρ<1
and μ = ∞ if ρ ≥ 1. We will show that there exists μ1 ∈ (γ,μ) such that the form of the
consumption function depends on the interval in which μ lies: (−∞,γ), (γ,μ1) or (μ1,μ).
We refer to these cases as the low-μ, intermediate-μ and high-μ cases respectively.
In all three cases, the consumption function is continuous everywhere except possibly
when x =0 , at which point the liquidity constraint may bind. When μ is low, the
consumption function is everywhere increasing, but the liquidity constraint is binding,
which generates an upward discontinuity at x =0 .W h e nμ is intermediate, there is an
upward discontinuity at x =0 , followed ﬁrst by a downward sloping region and thereafter
by an upward sloping region. When μ is high, the incentive to save is strong enough to
make the consumption function globally continuous and increasing.
Figure 5 shows three consumption functions corresponding to the three cases for μ.
These functions were obtained from careful numerical simulations of our model, but we
a r ea l s oa b l et oc o n ﬁrm their qualitative properties analytically. (See Online Appendix
G.) All three functions use the parameter values β = 2
3, γ =0 .05, σ =0 .17, ρ = 3
4 and
y =1 . These values are illustrative, but they are all empirically sensible (and y =1is
a normalization): they involve a present bias of about a third, a long-run discount rate
of 5%, an annual standard deviation of stock returns of 17% and a coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion of 3
4. The diﬀerences between the functions are the result of varying μ over
the set {0.04, 0.07, 0.09}: the top consumption function corresponds to μ =0 .04 (a low-μ
case); the middle consumption function corresponds to μ =0 .07 (an intermediate-μ case);
and the bottom consumption function corresponds to μ =0 .09 (a high-μ case). We will
refer back to this ﬁgure as we work through our formal results.
7.2. The low-μ case (discontinuity at zero wealth). The most novel case of our
model is μ<γ . The expected returns on the asset are not suﬃciently attractive to induce
the IG consumer to save when her wealth is zero, and the liquidity constraint binds. More
precisely, let c ∈ (y,∞) b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o no f
u
0(c)=β
u(c) − u(y)
c − y
. (28)
Theorem 9. If μ ∈ (−∞,γ) then: c(0) = y; c(0+) = c>y ;a n dc0 > 0 on (0,∞).Instantaneous Gratification 28
In other words: when the IG consumer has no wealth, she consumes all of her labor
income; if she acquires even a little wealth, then her consumption jumps up from y to
c; and her consumption increases monotonically with further increases in her wealth. In
particular, her consumption function is strictly increasing.
Proof. See Online Appendix G.
To understand Equation (28) consider a consumer with strictly positive wealth. In the
low μ case, the dynamics of wealth and consumption are causing wealth to trend lower.
We refer to the (stochastic) moment at which wealth runs out as the ‘crunch’. Suppose
that the consumption level of the pre-crunch self is c. Then the cost to the pre-crunch
s e l fo fp u t t i n ga s i d ea ne x t r adx units of wealth is u0(c)dx. If the post-crunch self receives
a windfall consisting of an extra dx units of wealth, she can raise her consumption level
from y to c for a length of time dt = dx/(c − y). The beneﬁt to the post-crunch self of
this increase in consumption is (u(c) − u(y))dt,a n dt h eb e n e ﬁt to the pre-crunch self is
β (u(c) − u(y))dt. The pre-crunch self is therefore indiﬀerent between putting aside the
extra dx units of wealth and not putting them aside if and only if
u
0(c)dx = β (u(c) − u(y))dt.
Substituting for dt and dividing through by dx, we obtain equation (28).
As Theorem 9 implies, for the top consumption function in Figure 5: the liquidity
constraint is binding, i.e. c(0) = y =1 ; there is an upward jump in consumption at x =0 ,
from c(0) = 1 to c(0+) = c ≈ 3.45; and consumption rises monotonically thereafter.
7.3. The high-μ case. The other polar case of our model is that in which μ>μ 1.I n
this case, the expected return is suﬃciently attractive to induce the IG consumer to save
even when her wealth is zero. More precisely:
Theorem 10. If μ ∈ (μ1,∞) then: c(0) <y ; c(0+) = c(0);a n dc0 > 0 on [0,∞).
In other words: when x =0 , she consume strictly less than her labor income; acquiring
a little wealth does not lead to a jump in consumption; and consumption increases strictly
with x. The bottom consumption function in Figure 5 reﬂects this.
Proof. See Online Appendix G.
7.4. The intermediate-μ case. The remaining case of our model is that in which
γ<μ<μ 1. Loosely speaking: when wealth is low, this case looks like the low-μ case; andInstantaneous Gratification 29
when wealth is high, it looks like the high-μ case. However, the most striking feature is
the behavior of the consumption function during the transition between the two regimes.
Theorem 11. If μ ∈ (γ,μ1) then: c(0) = y; c(0+) = c>y ; and there exists x ∈ (0,∞)
such that c0 < 0 on (0,x) and c0 > 0 on (x,∞).
In other words, when the IG consumer has no wealth, she consumes all of her labor
income. If she acquires even a little wealth, then her consumption jumps up from y to
c. As her wealth increases from 0 to x, her consumption decreases,b u t ,o n c eh e rw e a l t h
reaches x, her consumption increases steadily with further increases in her wealth.
Proof. See Online Appendix G.
As Theorem 11 leads us to expect, for the middle consumption function in Figure 5,
the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e. c(0) = y =1 . There is also an upward jump in
consumption at x =0 ,f r o mc(0) = 1 to c(0+) = c ≈ 3.45. Finally, consumption declines
smoothly after the upward jump before bottoming out and rising thereafter.
Comparing Theorem 11 with Theorems 9 and 10, a simple pattern emerges. The
strategic interaction between the current self and future selves induces a form of positive
feedback: the higher the marginal propensity to save of tomorrow’s self, the greater the
willingness of the current self to save, and therefore the higher her own marginal propensity
to save.
There are therefore two possible regimes: a high-consumption regime and a low-
consumption regime. When μ is low, the consumer ﬁnds herself in the high-consumption
regime irrespective of her wealth. When μ is intermediate, the consumer ﬁnds herself in
the high-consumption regime when her wealth is low, and in the low-consumption regime
when her wealth is high. So, naturally, her consumption needs to decrease as her wealth
increases in order to eﬀect the transition between the two regimes. Finally, when μ is
high, the consumer ﬁnds herself in the low-consumption regime irrespective of her wealth.
The non-monotonic consumption function in the intermediate-μ case is not a robust
feature of our model. We can show that this non-monotonicity vanishes when we introduce
a risk-free bond into the economy and allow investors to take long or short positions
in the bond. Taking a large short position in the bond enables the consumer to take
gambles that globally concavify her value function. This eliminates the regions of non-
monotonicity of the consumption function, since the value function would now have a
slope that is monotonically falling in wealth, and the consumer equates her marginal
utility of consumption to β times the slope of her value function.Instantaneous Gratification 30
Hence, two robust properties emerge from our analysis: a continuously diﬀerentiable
consumption function in the interior of the wealth space, and the potential for an upward
discontinuity of the consumption function at the point where the liquidity constraint binds
(x =0 ). This latter property cannot arise with an exponential discount function.
8. Conclusions
We have described a continuous-time model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting that extends
the analysis of Barro (1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003). Unlike these models,
our instantaneous-gratiﬁcation model allows for a generic class of preferences, includes
liquidity constraints and places no restrictions on equilibrium policy functions. In our
model, equilibrium is unique, resolving multiplicity problems in quasi-hyperbolic models.
Our paper studies a psychologically relevant limit case: we take the phrase ‘instant
gratiﬁcation’ literally, analyzing the case in which individuals prefer gratiﬁcation in the
present instant discretely more than consumption in the momentarily delayed future. This
limit case is analytically tractable, and can easily be adapted for a range of applications.43
Finally, from the perspective of calibration, the instantaneous-gratiﬁcation model serves
as a good approximation for models in which the “present” lasts for as long as a month.
Christopher Harris, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
David Laibson, Department of Economics, Harvard University, and National Bureau
of Economic Research
43A partial list of applications that use our framework include Amador (2003), Della Vigna and Paser-
man (2005), Grenadier and Wang (2007), Bisin and Hyndman (2009), and Hsiaw (2010, 2010a), Palacios-
Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse (2011).Instantaneous Gratification 31
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A. Proof of Lemma 2
Note ﬁrst that, if x =0 , then one option for the current self is to consume at rate y until
the future arrives, at which point she will get the continuation payoﬀ βv λ(0). This option
yields the payoﬀ
u(y)+λβv λ(0)
γ + λ
.
Second, as noted in the text, wλ − βv λ is the value function of a consumer who: (i) has
utility function (1 − β)u;( i i )d i s c o u n t st h ef u t u r ee x p o n e n t i a l l ya tr a t eγ + λ; and (iii)
has the exogenously given consumption function cλ. Hence wλ − βv λ ≤ (1 − β)eγ+λ for
all x ∈ [0,∞),w h e r eeγ+λ is the value function of a consumer who: (i) has utility function
u; (ii) discounts the future exponentially at rate γ +λ; and (iii) chooses her consumption
optimally. Hence
βv λ ≥ wλ − (1 − β)eγ+λ
for all x ∈ [0,∞).T h i r d ,
eγ+λ(0) = 1
γ+λ u(y)
whenever λ ≥ μ − γ.
Combining these three observations, we obtain
wλ(0) ≥
u(y)+λβv λ(0)
γ + λ
≥
u(y)+λ(wλ(0) − (1 − β)eγ+λ(0))
γ + λ
= λ
γ+λ wλ(0) +
γ+βλ
(γ+λ)2 u(y)
whenever λ ≥ μ − γ. Hence, rearranging,
wλ(0) ≥
γ+βλ
γ (γ+λ) u(y).
Finally, because there is no upper bound on consumption, we must have w0
λ ≥ 0.I t
follows that
wλ ≥ wλ(0)
for all x ∈ [0,∞). Passing to the limit, we then obtain βv= w ≥
β
γ u(y) for all x ∈ [0,∞).
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B. Proof of Theorem 4
W eb e g i nw i t ha no v e r v i e wo ft h ep r o o f .T h eﬁrst step is to use the optimality condition
of the IG consumer to eliminate c from her Bellman equation to yield what we call
the reduced Bellman equation of the IG consumer (i.e. the Bellman equation of the IG
consumer with c substituted out). The second step is to use the optimality condition of the
b u consumer to eliminate b c from her Bellman Equation to yield what we call the Reduced
Bellman Equation of the b u consumer (i.e. the Bellman Equation of the b u consumer with
b c substituted out). Third, we note that if we deﬁne b u+ and b u0 as in Section 5.2, then
the Reduced Bellman Equation of the IG consumer is identical to the Reduced Bellman
Equation of the b u consumer. Therefore the two reduced equations must have the same
set of solutions, and the two consumers must have the same set of value functions.
T u r n i n gt ot h eﬁrst step, for all α>0:l e tf+(α) be the unique c satisfying u0(c)=α;
and put h+(α)=u(f+(βα ))−αf +(βα ). Similarly, for all α ∈ R:l e tf0(α) be the unique
c satisfying u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),α};a n dp u th0(α)=u(f0(βα )) − αf 0(βα ). Finally, put
h(α,x)=
(
h+(α) if x>0
h0(α) if x =0
)
.
Then we may eliminate c from the Bellman Equation of the IG consumer to obtain the
diﬀerential equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 v
00 +( μx+ y)v
0 − γv+ h(v
0,x) (29)
for x ∈ [0,∞) and the global bounds
1
γ u(y) ≤ v ≤ v. (30)
We shall refer to equation (29) with global bounds (30) as the Reduced Bellman Equation
of the IG consumer.
As for the second step, let b u+, b u0 and b u be given exactly as in Section 5.2. Then it
can be checked that: (i) b u+ <uon (0,∞); and (ii) b u0 ≤ u on (0,y] with equality only
at y. It follows that, like the value function of the IG consumer, the value function b v of
the b u consumer satisﬁes b v ≤ v.I tc a na l s ob ec h e c k e dt h a tlime c→∞ b u+(b c)=l i m c→∞ u(c).
Hence there exists b ∈ (y,∞) such that b u+(b)=u(y). Hence, if the b u consumer consumes
b when x>0 and y when x =0 ,t h e ns h ew i l lo b t a i nap a y o ﬀ of 1
γ u(y). It follows thatInstantaneous Gratification 36
b v ≥ 1
γ u(y). Overall, then, the Bellman Equation of the b u consumer takes the form of the
diﬀerential equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 b v
00 +( μx+ y − b c)b v
0 − γ b v + b u(b c,x) (31)
for x ∈ [0,∞), the optimality condition
(
∂e u
∂e c(b c,x)=b v0 if x>0
∂e u
∂e c(b c,x)=m a x {b u0
0(y),b v0} if x =0
)
(32)
and the global bounds
1
γ u(y) ≤ b v ≤ v. (33)
For all α>0:l e tb f+(α) be the unique b c satisfying b u
0
+(b c)=α; and put b h+(α)=
b u+(b f+(α)) − α b f+(α). Similarly, for all α ∈ R:l e tb f0(α) be any b c satisfying b u0
0(b c)=
max{b u0
0(y),α};44 and put b h0(α)=b u0(b f0(α)) − α b f0(α) (which is uniquely deﬁned even
when b f0(α) is not). Finally, put
b h(α,x)=
(
b h+(α) if x>0
b h0(α) if x =0
)
.
Then we may eliminate b c from the Bellman Equation of the b u consumer, namely (31-33),
to obtain the diﬀerential equation
0=1
2 σ
2 x
2 b v
00 +( μx+ y)b v
0 − γ b v +b h(b v
0,x) (34)
for x ∈ [0,∞) and the global bounds
1
γ u(y) ≤ v ≤ v. (35)
We shall refer to equation (34) with global bounds (35) as the Reduced Bellman Equation
of the b u consumer.
Finally, it is easy to see that equations (29) and (34) will be identical iﬀ the functions
h and b h are the same. Moreover, as can be shown by direct calculation, this is indeed the
44In terms of b u+ and b f+,w eh a v e : b f0(α)=b f+(α) if α>b u
0
+(ψy); b f0(α) ∈ [ψy,y] if α = b u
0
+(ψy) and
b f0(α)=y if α<b u
0
+(ψy).Instantaneous Gratification 37
case for the given choice of b u+, b u0 and b u. Hence the Reduced Bellman Equation of the IG
consumer is identical to the Reduced Bellman Equation of the b u consumer, as required.
C . P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5
The proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix B above shows that v satisﬁes the Reduced Bellman
Equation of the IG consumer (i.e. the Bellman Equation of the IG consumer with c
substituted out) iﬀ v satisﬁes the Reduced Bellman Equation of the b u consumer (i.e. the
Bellman Equation of the b u consumer with b c substituted out). Furthermore, standard
considerations show that v satisﬁes the Reduced Bellman Equation of the b u consumer iﬀ
v is the value function of the optimization problem of the b u consumer. More explicitly, v
satisﬁes the Reduced Bellman Equation of the b u consumer iﬀ, for all x ∈ [0,∞), v(x) is
the supremum of all payoﬀs that are feasible for the b u consumer when her initial wealth is
x. This already yields both existence and uniqueness of v, for the simple reason that the
supremum of any set of numbers exists and is unique. In particular, the supremum of all
the feasible payoﬀso ft h eb u consumer exists and is unique. Turning to the consumption
function, we recall that u0(c)=βv 0 if x>0 and u0(c)=m a x {u0(y),βv 0} if x =0 .S i n c e
u is strictly concave (and therefore u0 is invertible), the existence and uniqueness of c
follows directly from the existence and uniqueness of v.
D . P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8
The basic idea behind the proof is to view vσ as the value function of the optimization
problem of the stochastic b u consumer and v as the value function of the optimization
problem of the deterministic b u consumer. There are several ways of implementing this
idea. One way is to note that the dynamics of the problem depend continuously on σ,
and that the utility function b u is upper semicontinuous. (It is continuous except at x =0 ,
w h e r ei tm a yj u m pu pi nt h el i m i ta sx ↓ 0,b e c a u s eb u0 ≥ b u+.) From this it follows at once
that limsupσ↓0 vσ(x) ≤ v(x) for all x ∈ [0,∞). On the other hand, explicit consideration
of the form of the optimal consumption function b c of the deterministic b u consumer shows
that limσ↓0 vσ(x;b c)=v(x) for all x ∈ [0,∞),w h e r evσ(x;b c) denotes the payoﬀ to the
stochastic b u consumer when she employs the consumption function b c.S p e c i ﬁcally: if
μ<1
β γ, then there exists ε>0 such that b c is continuous on (0,ε) and b c(0+) = ψc>y ,
where ψ =
ρ−(1−β)
ρ ;a n d ,i fμ ≥ 1
β γ,t h e nb c is continuous on [0,∞) and b c(0) ≤ ψy<y.I n
particular, liminfσ↓0 vσ(x) ≥ v(x).The span of control (solid line) of self n lasts from its time of birth (t = sn) to the time 
of birth of self n+1 (t = sn+1).  The length of this control period, sn+1 –s n, is the 
stochastic variable   n , which has an exponential distribution.  
Figure 1: Sequential generations of autonomous selves.
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Figure 2: Realization of discount function (β = 0.7, γ = 0.1)
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The discount function represents the present value of one unit of future utility.  The discount 
function discretely drops when the present ends and the future begins.  This present-to-future 
transition occurs at a stochastic time. Figure 2 shows a particular realization of this transition.0
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Figure 3: Expected value of discount function 
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The expected value of the discount function is plotted for β = 0.7 and γ = 0.1. With λ = 0, the future never arrives and
the function is exp(-γt).  As long as λ is strictly positive, the future will eventually arrive so the function asymptotes to 
β exp(-γt).  The higher the value of λ the faster the function asymptotes.  Figure 4: graph of u, u  
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Figure 5: Consumption functions for
These consumption functions were generated in Matlab by numerically solving the Bellman System of the IG 
consumer                                                                                 .  The top two cases have a discontinuity at x = 0. (with 2 3, 0.05, 0.17, 3 4,  1) y     
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